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Survey data before and after the statewide implementation of an Electronic Benefit Transfer
system in Maryland is used to estimate the impact of this system on net food expenditure out of
Food Stamp Program (FSP) benefits and income.  A reduction in the net food expenditure from
FSP benefits relative to income reduces the FSP s ability to target food expenditure.THE EFFECT OF AN ELECTRONIC BENEFIT TRANSFER (EBT) SYSTEM ON FOOD
EXPENDITURE  OF FOOD STAMP RECIPIENTS: EVIDENCE FROM THE MARYLAND
STATEWIDE IMPLEMENTATION
1. Introduction
An electronic benefits transfer (EBT) system is an alternative to paper food stamps that
are currently used to issue and redeem Food Stamp Program (FSP) benefits.  EBT is a point-of-
sale terminal network system that uses plastic magnetic encoded cards much like ATM cards. 
The welfare reform bill, signed in August 1996, requires every state to distribute FSP benefits
using an EBT system by 2002.  As of March 1998, thirty-one states had operational food stamp
EBT systems with thirteen operating statewide EBT systems. 
Over the past twenty years, USDA has undertaken several demonstration projects to
establish the feasibility of EBT technology and to evaluate its effect on recipients, food retailers,
and financial institutions.  Previous demonstration projects of the EBT technological have found
that existing FSP recipients prefer EBT over paper food stamps.  However, in spite of the
extensive evaluations, there is little evidence available to suggest if the implementation of EBT
will affect the behavior of actual or potential recipients (GAO, 1994). 
 Conceptually, EBT can affect behavior by altering the stigma associated with FSP
participation.  This change in FSP stigma has the potential to affect behavior in two ways.
(1)   A reduction in FSP stigma will lower the (psychic) cost of participating in this program, and,
thus, increase the number of participating households even though the criteria used to determine
eligibility are unaffected.
1  Since approximately 30-40 percent of households eligible for the FSP
do not participate, the implementation of EBT has the potential to increase FSP participation.  (2)
                                               
1 Other factors such as improve security and convenience could also make participation in
an EBT system more attractive and led to increased participation.2
A reduction in FSP stigma increases the substitutability of food bought with food stamps and with
income. This change will reduce the marginal propensity to spend on food out of food stamps by
FSP participants, and, can potentially reduce the political support of the FSP as a low-income 
assistance program that targets food expenditure.
In this paper, evidence of the impact of EBT on food expenditure is evaluated.  Data on
the food expenditure by FSP recipients before and after the statewide implementation of EBT in
Maryland in 1992-93 are used to estimate a food expenditure equation in each regime. A
comparison of these results indicate that the implementation of EBT in Maryland reduced the
marginal propensity to spend on food out of food stamp benefits by approximately 10 percent. 
Bootstrap confidence intervals indicate that this difference is significant at the 1% level.
2. The Impact of EBT on the Relationship Between Food Expenditures, Food Stamp Benefits,
and Income
A unique feature of paper food stamps is that a given amount of benefits provided in this
form increases net food expenditure by more than an equal amount of income.  Empirically, this
relationship have been noted by several different authors using a variety of data covering different
time periods (Fraker, 1990).   Estimates of the marginal propensity to spend out of food stamp
benefits have ranged from between two to ten time the estimated marginal propensity to spend
out of income.
The traditional utility maximizing model used to specify the food expenditure equation of
food stamp recipients is due to Southworth (1945).  This specification, however, is unable to
rationalize the empirical difference between food stamp and income for recipients who spend3
some income on food in addition to their food stamp benefits.  For these inframarginal recipients,
who are the vast majority of FSP participants, the Southworth formulation implies that the
marginal propensities to spend on food out of income or food stamps should be the same.   
A recent paper by Levedahl (1995) provides a utility maximizing specification of the food
expenditure equation for food stamp recipients in which the marginal propensities of the
inframarginal recipient are not necessarily equal.  This generalization was achieved by assuming
that food bought with food stamps and with income are less than perfect substitutes.  In this
specification, food expenditure by the food stamp recipient who spend all their food stamps on
food was derived as,
(1)   E = pD(p,po,Y,So) + (1 - g2/g1)So, 
where E is total food expenditure;  p,po are the price of food and other goods; Y is the total cash
income;  So is the dollar value of food stamp benefits;   the function D(.) denotes the total demand
for food bought with income; and g2, g1 are, respectively, equilibrium values of the Lagrangian
multipliers associated with the food stamp and the income constraints. 
Since, in equilibrium, a Lagrangian multiplier is equal to the marginal utility of the
constraint, the ratio g2/g1 can be interpreted as the recipient=s evaluation of food stamp benefits
relative to those of income.  This interpretation implies that So worth of food stamps will
substitute for income (g2/g1)So spent on food.  If food bought with income and food stamp are
fungible then g2 = g1 and each dollar of food stamps benefits substitutes for a dollar of  food
bought with income.  The fungible case is illustrated in the Southworth model.  In that model
inframarginal recipients $cash-out# their food stamps, and the only effect of food stamps on food
is from an increased demand for food bought with income through the scale effect.4
    Even though most recipients can cash-out their food stamps, they choose not to.  Instead,
recipients use a dollars worth of food stamps to substitute for something less than a dollars worth
of food bought with income.  Estimates based on data collected after the elimination of the
purchase requirement in 1979, indicate that an additional dollar of food stamps benefits
substituting for approximately 75 to 80 cents of food bought with income.
In this paper, two possible hypotheses concerning the impact of EBT on the marginal
propensity to spend on food out of food stamp benefits are tested.  The first version is based on
the above discussion and predicts that EBT will cause the marginal propensity to spend out of
food stamp benefits to fall.  The second version predicts that EBT will cause this marginal
propensity to increase.  Both versions predict that the marginal propensity out of income will fall.
Version 1:  If the implementation of EBT reduces FSP stigma, as is commonly assumed, food
bought with food stamps and income will become closer substitutes.  This will increase J￿￿J￿ and
food stamps will substitute for a greater amount of food bought with income thereby reducing the
marginal propensity to spend on food out of food stamp benefits.
A heuristic way of characterizing the effect of EBT on food expenditures in this case is to
think of the current paper system and a cash benefits system as two endpoints.  At one end, the
current paper system results in greater food expenditure from food stamp benefits than from an
equal amount of cash.  At the other end, food stamps benefits and cash would be indistinguishable
and generate the same food expenditure. By making food stamp benefits more cash like, EBT
makes the propensity to spend on food out of food stamp benefits more like the propensity to
spend out of income.
Version 2:  An alternative view of EBT holds that this system will increase food purchases from5
food stamp benefits (for example, GAO, p.43).  Currently, up to 99 cents in change can legally be
obtained by food stamp recipients on a given shopping occasion.  EBT provides for an exact
deduction of benefits from a recipient s account, eliminates the need for cash change, and thus
eliminates the possibility that recipients will use the change for non-food purchases.  By
preventing this diversion of food stamp benefits for cash change, this alternative hypothesis
implies that EBT will increase the marginal propensity to spend on food out of food stamp
benefits, and decrease the marginal propensity to spend on food out of income.
3.  Description of the Pre and Post Implementation Surveys
The data used in this paper were collected as part of the Expanded EBT Demonstration in
Maryland (1994) conducted by Abt Associates under contract from USDA.  Maryland was the
first state to implement a statewide EBT system and this demonstration project was conducted to
investigate features that might not be evident in earlier pilot demonstration projects.
Two surveys were conducted as part of this demonstration.  A pre-implementation
recipient survey, which addressed paper-system experience, was conducted between March and
September 1992; the post-implementation survey, one year later, between June and September
1993. EBT was implemented in most jurisdictions in Maryland between June 1992 and April
1993.  Food stamp recipients who had receiving benefits under the appropriate system for the two
months prior to sample selection were eligible for the surveys. Recipients in both surveys were
drawn using a two-stage cluster sampling design.
Respondents were asked to recall their food expenditure, income and food stamp benefits,
etc. from the previous month.  This procedure does not provide the levels of precision obtained
from a detailed diary enumeration of household food use.  However, there is no ex-ante reason to6
expect that the levels and types of measurement error will change between the two surveys.
In total, pre and post implementation surveys consisted of 1,100 and 1,055 food stamp
recipients (households), respectively.  Missing values reduced the usable samples to 1,016 and
959 households.  In addition, 7 household in the pre implementation survey and 5 households in
the post implementation survey were deleted because their food expenditure exceeded twice their
total income (cash income plus food stamp benefits).
2
Results from the surveys indicated that average food expenditure fell from $211.13 to
$194.37;  food expenditure per household member fell from $92.00 to $84.66; and the household
food share fell from 0.404 to 0.368 with the implementation of EBT.   These differences were all
statistically significant at the 1% level.  In addition, the average monthly number of shopping trips
by recipients to food store increased after the implementation of EBT from 3.8 to 4.6, a difference
that was again significant at the 1% level.
These results suggest that the implementation of EBT in Maryland affected the  food
expenditure behavior by FSP recipients.  In the next section, food expenditure equations are
estimated separately for both pre and post samples in order to evaluate whether EBT might have
changed the structural relationship between food stamp benefits, income and food expenditures.
4.  Estimates of the Food Expenditure Equation for Food Stamp Recipients Before and After the
Implementation of EBT
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WKDQ WKH PHDQ IRRG VKDUH RI WKH LQFOXGHG KRXVHKROGV￿
Estimates of the food expenditure equation of food stamp recipients were obtained using7
the functional form introduced by Senauer and Young (1986).  This specification is written as,
(2)    ln(food expenditure) = a0 + a1 ln(total income) + a2 (food stamp benefits/total income) + J.
Total income consist of cash income plus food stamp benefits.  The a s are coefficients to be
estimated.  The coefficient a0 is assumed to be a function of demographic variables, and reflects
the influence of, for example,  unit size and composition, etc., as well as the effect of (constant)
prices.  J is an error term.  The specification of this error term is discussed below.
Senauer and Young used this specification to demonstrate that the composition of total
income affects food expenditure, i.e., a2 g 0.  Levedahl showed that this specification is the only
functional form commonly used to estimate the food expenditure equation of food stamp
recipients that exhibits 2nd order flexibility.  The marginal propensities to spend out of food
stamps and income given by this specification, are, respectively,
(3)   MPSS = w(a1 + a2 ay),  and
(4)   MPSY = w(a1 - a2 as)      
where w is the food expenditure share, and as + ay =1 are food stamp and cash income shares,  all
out of total income.
  Marginal propensities were calculated for each recipient ((3) and (4)) using the
appropriate LS estimates of  a1 and a2 conditional on the recipient s food expenditure share and
the share of food stamps to total income. The average marginal propensities for recipients in the
pre and post implementation surveys are reported in column 1 of table 1.   The results indicate
that the average marginal propensity to spend out of food stamp benefits by recipients fell about 6
cents and the marginal propensity out of income fell about 1 cents after the implementation of 
EBT. 8
A t-test is traditionally used to test whether the difference between two sample means is 
statistical significant.  Application of this test to evaluate the significance of the difference
between the average marginal propensities before and after the implementation of EBT is
complicated by the fact that the marginal propensities of each food stamp recipient is a function of
the estimated LS coefficients.  This means that the observations used to calculate the sample
averages are not independent.  This lack of independence invalidates the t-test for determining
whether the mean marginal propensities are equal before and after the implementation of EBT. 
  In this paper, the statistical difference between the marginal propensities are evaluated
using bootstrap procedures as an alternative to a t-test.  However before presenting the results of
the bootstrap analysis, results of some specification tests of the food expenditure equation (2) are
presented.  These tests were conducted in order to evaluate whether LS was likely to provide
consistent estimates of the parameters a1 and a2.
4.1 Specification Tests of the Food Expenditure Equation
It is common for models based on cross-sectional data to exhibit heteroskedasticity in the
error term J. And, in fact, the LS estimates indicated evidence that the food expenditure equation
of food stamp recipients for both the pre and post implementation surveys, are subject to
heteroskedastic errors.  Based on White s (1980b) direct test of heteroskedastic, the null
hypothesis of homoskedastic errors was rejected at conventional  levels for both the pre and post
equations, see table 2.  The evidence for heteroskedastic, however, is much strong in the pre-
implementation survey, 
For the purpose of comparing the pre and post marginal propensities, the existence of
heteroskedastic, per say, is not a particular problem since confidence intervals for these9
differences are numerically calculated in this paper using bootstrap methods.  In particular, it is
not necessary when bootstrapping to explicitly model the structure of heteroskedastic,  as require
in the traditional parametric approach, to get a consistent estimate of the covariance structure. 
Instead, a consistent estimate of the limiting distribution of the desired statistic can be generated
from resamples of the original surveys providing these samples are $good# representations of their
populations.
However, it is well known that other types of misspecification associated with a lack of
independence between regressors and the errors, such as, for example, omitted variables,
measurement errors, simultaneity, etc,, can be responsible for the rejection of the null hypothesis
in tests of heteroskedasticity.  These other causes of model misspecification would present a more
serious problem.  In particular,  LS estimates of a1 and a2, used to calculate the marginal
propensities in (2) would be inconsistent with this type of misspecification and any inference based
on these estimates would be flawed.
In the case the investigator is unsure about the correctness of the model specification,
White (1980b, p.824) suggests performing a specification test (White, 1980a) to augment the
direct heteroskedastic test.  This specification test is sensitive to model misspecification but not
heteroskedastic.  Accepting the null hypothesis of no model misspecification would indicate,
therefore, that the result of the direct heteroskedastic test may be (reasonably) attributed to the
existence of heteroskedastic errors.  Thursby (1982) also suggests a similar strategy for
discriminating between heteroskedastic and misspecification.
In this paper, White s specification test was undertaken using the variable addition method
suggested by Breusch and Godfrey (1986, p.51-53) with the reciprocal of the squared fitted10
values of  ln(food expenditure) under the null hypothesis as weights.  The results of this test
indicates no specification error in either the pre or post estimates at conventional significance
levels, however, the evidence is not as strong for the post-implementation survey, see table 2.
White notes that since his direct heteroskedastic and specification tests are dependent, the
formal size of the sequential procedure is difficult to determine.  Alternatively, the
misspecification test can be performed using the RESET test.  This test is also insensitive to
heteroskedastic (Ramsey and Gilbert, 1972), and can be performed at the desired level, at least
asymptotically.  Calculation of RESET(4) again indicated no misspecification for either pre or
post estimates at conventional levels, see table 2.
3
Based on the specification tests reported in table 2, the analysis will continue based on the
assumption that LS provides consistent estimates of a1 and a2.
4.2 Bootstrap Confidence Intervals
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  Table 1 lists various measures obtained from the bootstrap estimates of the sampling
distribution of the average marginal propensities.  These measures were calculated from
histograms obtained by bootstrapping the recipients in the pre and post surveys.  Draws were
taken by resampling entire cases of data with each bootstrap sample conforming with the sample
size in the original survey.   For each bootstrap sample,  the food expenditure equation was
estimated using LS and average marginal propensities were calculated for the original sample of
recipients using the new coefficient estimates of  a1 and a2.  These calculations provided 100011
bootstrap estimates of the marginal propensities in each of the pre and post implementation
regimes.
The statistical significance of the observed difference in the average marginal propensities
in the two regimes was tested as follows.  In the order of the bootstrap draws (1 to 1000)  the
difference between the corresponding pre and post average marginal propensities was calculated. 
The resulting empirical distribution function given by the 1000 differences was then used to
approximate the confidence intervals around the true difference in the average marginal
propensities.  This calculation was done for pre and post differences in both MPSS and MPSY.
 Estimates of the 99 percent confidence interval of the difference in the mean marginal
propensities in the pre and post survey are given in the sixth and seventh row of the last column of
 table 1.   For both income and food stamps, these confidence intervals lie completely above zero.
 These results provide strong evidence that the MPSS and MPSY are smaller after the
implementation of EBT.
Presumably, more efficient estimates of a1 and a2 would give smaller bootstrap confidence
intervals for a given size.  This would, however, require modeling the underlying heteroskasdicity.
 Results in table 1 indicate, however, that the differences in the marginal propensities are large
enough that this extra step is unnecessary.
5. Conclusion
When the current welfare reform legislation was first introduced in Congress as the
Personal Responsibility Act (1994) one of its objectives was to dismantle the existing FSP and
provide food assistance benefits as block grants to the states.  At the time, this was generally
interpreted to mean that the states would convert this program to one that paid cash benefits.  In12
the final legislation signed into law, however, the FSP was preserved in its existing form as a
federal entitlement, admittedly with major modifications. 
The success of maintaining the FSP as a federal entitlement can, to a large extent, be 
attributed to this program s ability to target food expenditure.  Empirical evidence has measured
food expenditure by recipients to be greater when benefits are provided in the form of food
stamps then when provided as cash. 
In this paper, evidence has been presented that the implementation of EBT in Maryland
weakened the link between food expenditure and food stamp benefits.  However, even after the
implementation of EBT the difference between the impact of food stamps and income on food
expenditure continued to be large.
Unfortunately, the Expanded EBT Demonstration did not collect information on either
food intake or food prices paid by FSP recipients so that it is impossible to identify the source of
the lower food expenditure.  One possibility is that EBT, by lowering the stigma associated with
food stamps, increased the number of food stores FSP recipients used.  After EBT, recipients may
be more willing to shop in food stores in suburban area that have lower prices than the typical
urban store.
It remains to determine whether additional experience in an EBT regime will have a
further impact on food expenditure in Maryland.  Also it would be useful to determine if the
impact of  EBT on food expenditure measured in this paper is specific to Maryland or a general
feature of EBT systems that are implemented statewide in other states.13
Table 1: Sample Mean Marginal Propensity to Spend Out of Food Stamps (MPSS) and Mean
Marginal Propensity to Spend Out of Income (MPSY) and Their Difference for Recipients in the
Pre and Post-Implementation Surveys and Bootstrap Quintiles of the Estimated Limiting
Distributions Using LS Estimates of the Food Expenditure Equation
                                                                                                                                                     
 
                                                                            Bootstrap Estimates                                          
                         Sample
                    Mean           Mean   Median     SE            IQR                  95% CI               99% CI
                                                                       
Pre
MPSS 0.521 0.523 0.522 0.049 0.489/0.555 0.433/0.623 0.410/0.656
MPSY 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.014 0.000/0.020 -0.018/0.037 -0.031/0.047
Post
MPSS 0.461 0.462 0.460 0.058 0.423/0.497 0.359/0.586 0.321/0.624
MPSY -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 0.015 -0.015/0.007 -0.033/0.026 -0.045/0.033
DMPSS 0.060 0.061 0.062 0.058/0.066 0.038/0.074 0.030/0.083
 (pre - post)
DMPSY 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.013/0.014 0.011/0.016 0.011/0.017
 (pre - post)
                           
IQR: Inter-quartile range
CI: Confidence interval
SE: standard error of bootstrap means14
 Table 2:  Misspecification Test Results for the Food Expenditure Equation Based on Pre and  
                Post Implementation Survey Data (observed level of significance in parentheses)















              
a.  p=36, this version includes the second moments of the exogenous variables excluding the
intercept and dummy variables, p=k (k +1)/2 .
b.  k is the number of regressors under the null excluding the intercept, here k=19.
c.  k is the number of regressors in the unrestricted case, here k=23.15
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